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instruments on a shipper and her transport suppliers through a monte carlo
simulation. After reviewing the literature, we propose a model to measure
the beneﬁts in terms of expected transport cost and variance of this cost.
We evaluate three scenarios over a reiterated-single period setting in a ship-
per carrier single-echelon model with a mix of long-term and short-term
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1 Introduction
Transport is principally a capacity-constrained, ﬁxed-cost service industry.
Because of its highly speciﬁc nature and ability to share costs and investments
among several clients, transport is overwhelmingly outsourced. We investigate a
case where, through the monte carlo method, the proﬁts of private information is
compared with the centralized coordinated case of common information using a
binormal distribution. More than scientiﬁc evidence, this paper wishes to nourish
an ongoing debate wihtin the ranks of practitioners and let researchers gauge the
importance for the industry of the common practice of withholding information
from the other party.
This paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature in the next
section, the third section describes the model involving one shipper as client and
one carrier as transport supplier. In the fourth section, we describe three scenar-
ios of behaviour: in the ﬁrst, base scenario, the information is common to both,
decisions are centrally coordinated. In the second scenario, the carrier retains
information from the shipper. In the third, both shipper and carrier hide infor-
mation from each other. In the ﬁfth section, the numerical study, we generate a
sample of instances of demands and transport spot prices and run each scenario
on that sample. Conclusions as to the importance and impact of both information
and contractual arrangements between shipper and carrier are drawn in the ﬁnal
section.
2 Literature review
Supply chain performance depends critically on how its members coordinate their
decisions. And it is hard to imagine coordination without some form of informa-
tion sharing, as noted in Chen (2004). The transport industry’s efﬁciency can be
increased by coordination, truth-inducing mechanisms, contractual engineering
and information sharing as shown in Chen (2004, 1998), Chen & Yu (2005), Por-
teus & Whang (1991), Lee & Whang (2000), Cachon & Lariviere (1999a), Zhao
et al. (2002). However, since their supplier deﬁnition entails back-logging of
orders and inventory management, not all results apply to carriers or shippers. Er-
togral et al. (1998) integrates production and transportation planning, taking into
account transport costs and schedules. This approach does not take into account
the impact of asymmetric information and decentralized decisions. Neither does
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capacity involved.
The transport industry characterizes itself by the non-scalable capital inten-
sive capacity investments needed and a high share of ﬁxed costs within total costs.
Capacity can be expanded only well in advance of capacity requirement. Full
capacity utilization is thus one of the primary objectives. Supply chain manage-
ment dedicates commendable space to capacity as a limiting factor; authors have
modeled that constraint in several papers.
Apaperthathasmodeledcontractingarrangementsforcapital-intensive, capacity-
constrained goods is Wu et al. (2002). The paper provides valuable insights on
theoptimalbalancebetweensellingcapacityintheforwardcontractmarketversus
selling on the spot market. The results give a structure where a buyer and a seller
can derive guidance on the optimal strategy between optimal forward contracting
and spot buying of capacity. This model applies aptly to energy and other bulk
products that have standard quality, interchangeable buyers and sellers and that
rely on relatively efﬁcient spot markets. This is not exactly the case of transport:
parties to a contract have to iron out several operational details as to execution,
quality criteria, etc that make each contract unique and entails greater transaction
costs.
Spinler & Huchzermeier (2005) propose a variation of the preceding model by
using options in lieu of futures contracts and spot market to increase capacity uti-
lization in the presence of state-contingent demand. The purpose is to effectively
offset part of the risk posed by ﬂuctuating demand by a strategy which combines
buying options on capacity ahead of revelation of demand and complementing by
spot transactions upon the period of requiring that capacity. They show that such a
strategy effectively is Pareto improving for both the seller of the option (transport
supplier) and the buyer (the shipper). Both reduce their risk and the volatility of
their costs. To circumvent the liquidity problem of transport as a non-standardized
service, the model assumes that options will be traded on electronic marketplaces
where information and transaction costs are lesser. As Grieger (2003) reported,
carriers and shippers may be wary to trade with partners of unknown quality and
customer-satisfaction drive, jeopardizing the forecast efﬁciency and welfare. This
issue does not arise for electricity, the other industry speciﬁcally addressed in
Spinler & Huchzermeier (2005), because of the more standardized nature of the
traded good.
We draw on the capacity constrained with uncertain demand coordination
mechanisms stream of literature (Anupindi & Bassok, 1998, Tsay, 1999, Tsay &
Lovejoy, 1999, Tsay et al. , 1999, Cachon, 2004), designed to align the behaviours
of the supplier and retailer. In common with this literature, capacity has to beInﬂuence of information on transport cost 4
planned well in advance, hence the carrier has a strong incentive to encourage
the buyer to forecast and plan honestly the cargo to be effectively transported
(see the capacity allocation game in Cachon & Lariviere, 1999b). We model the
incentive that the carrier has to include in the contract for that coordination to
take place. The simplest mechanism is for the shipper to pay the carrier a penalty
when realized demand comes in at a level inferior to contracted capacity. This
mechanism has been studied in Cachon & Lariviere (2001): the manufacturer
pays a cancelation fee per unit not purchased if he takes delivery of fewer than the
agreed-upon number of units. Another would be for the carrier to extract from the
shipper a commitment for a given capacity, whatever the realized demand.
Similarly, the shipper must obtain the maximum capacity at the least price
given demand risk. In other words, he must angle for risk sharing with the carrier.
Just settling for a given capacity at a set price is not enough for him to achieve low
transport cost variance over a long time horizon. Thus some measure of ﬂexibility
in capacity has to be introduced. Two such mechanisms are implemented here.
One is a menu of extra capacities at pre-arranged prices: if the demand effectively
exceeds the base contractual capacity, the shipper calls up extra capacity to meet
it using this clause to set the premium price. The other is a penalty clause for
the carrier when he is unable to meet the capacity thus committed: whenever
the carrier fails to meet the shipper’s demand, he pays a penalty proportionate to
the shortcoming. In Moinzadeh & Nahmias (2000) that same general problem
is treated: Q, the minimum commitment per period is given and there are both
ﬁxed and proportional penalties for adjustments, over an inﬁnite horizon. The
authors contend, but do not formally prove, that a type of order-up-to policy (s,S)
is optimal. In that model, the ﬁxed delivery contract with penalties serves as a risk
sharing mechanism.
Becausethedemand, whenrealized, directlyresultsinatransportrequirement,
there can be no time-ﬂexibility arrangements as those described in the literature
(Li & Kouvelis, 1999).
It has to be mentioned that, in our approach, we have elected to consider that
transport capacities are not freely substitutable, ruling out “overbooking” (Karaes-
men & van Ryzin, 2002). In other words, a carrier cannot just overbook his ﬂeet
on a given time slot because cargo cannot just be shifted to the next available one
and there are few cases of “no-shows”.
Our market mechanism draws also on the model in Seifert et al. (2004) for
simultaneous long-term and short-term (spot) buying of commodities by a client
from one or various suppliers. They show that buying a “moderate” fraction of
total needs on the spot market signiﬁcantly improves proﬁts over the contract-Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 5
only behaviour.
Our general model follows a similar pattern to that adopted in Gavirneni et al.
(1999). That study set up three scenarios that differ by the information level of the
participants. In this case, the information is the distribution of the sales addressed
to the retailer and whether or not the supplier can be aware of the law of that
demand, and whether he can further beneﬁt by receiving immediately sales data
from the retailer. To study the impact of information on capacity and inventory,
each scenario evaluates the level of information affecting the optimum capacity
and inventory at the supplier level. Penalties for the supplier are included when
demand addressed to him goes unsatisﬁed.
3 Transport Model
We assume that a shipper S requires some speciﬁc transport infrastructure. She
contends with uncertainty on two fronts: the ﬁrst is a stochastic demand. The
second is a market for transport services where spot prices can vary, substantially
affecting her costs (ﬁgure 2).
Because of uncertainty on these two fronts, the shipper S chooses to minimize
at least one source of uncertainty by tendering for a long term contract. To com-
plement this contract, S also has the ability to buy extra capacity from the rest of
the market for a spot transport price (equivalent to short term contracts, see Seifert
et al. (2004)).
Let C be the carrier who has signed the contract with S and who further serves
the market for unused capacity at the going spot price. Every period, C ﬁrst serves
the demand from S than from the market. However, capacity is not binding for the
shipper: whenever she cannot purchase the necessary capacity from C, she turns
to the spot market for the remainder.
3.1 Motivation of shipper and carrier behaviour
3.1.1 Opportunistic behaviour
We include in the model the possibility that one or both parties will behave oppor-
tunistically during the lifetime of the contract. This can happen through hold up
situations especially since both carrier and shipper have to invest in speciﬁc assets
to be able to comply with the contract requirements: speciﬁc transport vehicles,
speciﬁc quality-enhancing procedures, personnel training, warehouses, software,Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 6
logistical equipment, etc. We make no assumption about relative power of each
player. In our model, both shipper and carrier are risk averse: the shipper wishes
to avert the transport price volatility inherent in the spot market, the carrier wishes
to ensure steady and sufﬁcient revenues to match his ﬁnancial and commercial
costs over the long term.
We have chosen for simplicity’s sake to restrict our demonstration to just two
forms of information amenable to modeling: information about the available ca-
pacity that the carrier can offer to the shipper and information on the exact demand
addressed to the shipper. If information about available capacity is kept from the
shipper she may not know that the carrier is in fact redeploying it for better proﬁt
elsewhere. On the other hand, if the carrier is not cognizant of the exact demand
addressed to the shipper, he may not be able to observe that capacity has been
bought from some competitor at a lower price.
Depending upon the spot price in the market and since the carrier’s total ca-
pacity ex-post is non-veriﬁable and non-observable by the shipper, the carrier can
engage in hidden action by refusing to comply with the demand from the shipper,
pay the corresponding penalty θc and sell this excess capacity in the spot market.
In this case, the shipper has no other recourse than to offer his cargo on the spot
market. We have not modeled the loss of lead time that ensues, but it clearly has
an impact to the shipper that could be evaluated and included in a future study.
The shipper S can also deviate when her realized demand is not observable by
the carrier. When the spot price is lower than the menu of prices less the penalty,
the shipper can deviate by refusing to purchase capacity in excess of q from the
carrier and instead buy the necessary complement from the spot market. She can
also deviate when the spot market price is less than the contractual price less the
penalty for not complying with the basic volume in the contract.
3.1.2 Information scenarii
We will study both under different scenarios: under the base scenario, both infor-
mation is common knowledge. The shipper S observes the exact available capac-
ity at each period of carrier C and C observes the realized demand addressed to S.
In the second scenario, S cannot observe the capacity of C, but C does observe
S’s realized demand (or S makes that information available to C). In our third
scenario, S cannot observe C’s capacity and C cannot observe S’s realized de-
mand. In effect, we assume that there is no common knowledge of payoffs, or at
least that this knowledge comes at a price. We do not model or attempt to include
in our model the cost of such information gathering.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 7
By the construction of our model, the gains of one party are the losses of the
other, meaning that globally, social welfare does not increase except perhaps by
lowered transaction costs in the following contract (if there is one).
We have not modeled a fourth possible scenario in this paper: when the ship-
per knows the capacity of the carrier and the carrier is not aware of the exact
demand received by the shipper. Examining this scenario would add neither to the
demonstration nor purpose of this paper.
3.2 Contract characteristics
3.2.1 Contract
Both carrier and shipper have an interest in ﬁxing for the longest possible period
the price of the service to be delivered because of decreased volatility of earnings
(for the carrier) or costs (for the shipper). The capacity contracted is the object
of ex-ante veriﬁcation by the shipper. Refusing to honour this basic capacity re-
quirement is a motive to reopen the contract and eventually to terminate it, so it is
considered here that neither shipper nor carrier will renege on that commitment.
3.2.2 Minimum purchase commitments
It is considered here as established by Cachon & Lariviere (2001), Cachon &
Zipkin (1999) that the optimal minimum purchase commitment for both shipper
and carrier under asymmetric information corresponds to the average demand that
the shipper expects over each period of the life of the contract. A penalty for the
unused contracted capacity is set by the carrier to encourage credible information
as to expected demand from the shipper.
3.2.3 Additional menu of capacities
To allow for some ﬂexibility in the demand that the shipper receives, a menu of
prices that give some additional capacities so that the shipper can call upon under
certain conditions of price is included. This menu of prices encourages the shipper
tocalluponthecarrierfortheunforeseendemandreceived1. Thisaddedﬂexibility
is of increasing value to the buyer as market environment becomes more volatile,
(Tsay et al. , 1999, Tsay & Lovejoy, 1999).
1 Thepriceishigherthanthebasecapacitypricebecausethemarginalcosttothecarrierofsuch
capacity is higher because it constrains his overall capacity and ability to meet other commitments.
Bear in mind that capacity is non-scalable unless notiﬁed well in advance.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 8
3.2.4 Time-line
The order in which the decisions take place are the following (see also ﬁgures 1
and 2):
• S observes expected demand and selects C
• S observes carrier capacity W, contract negotiated and signed.
• S ﬁrst observes demand Q and spot market transport price P.
• S decides on the allocation of a share u of demand Q to C.
• C observes the spot market price and allocates capacity x to S and xs to the
spot market.
• After observing the allocation of capacity by C to her, S allocates the re-
maining demand Q − x to the spot market.
• Transport is performed.
• Payout occurs.
There could be an interesting study to be done however in the case where a
large number of clients face the same highly seasonal demand and the transporting
providers’ capacity is a bottleneck.
3.2.5 Notation
C and S have negotiated ex-ante and are bound by a contract extending over n
periods with known and ﬁxed parameters. S agrees to buy at each period capac-
ity q at price c. The shipper has to pay a penalty θs for unused capacity up to
q at each period. The contract includes a menu of prices pa at quantities qa that
the carrier offers to the shipper S to help him meet demand in excess of the con-
tracted capacity commitment q up till qa (ﬁgure 2). The menu is a list of prices
linear with the capacity offered. This seems counter intuitive: one would expect
that the higher the capacity sought by the shipper, the lesser the marginal cost to
the carrier, so that the carrier would be motivated to make a volume discount to
capture the excess demand. We will revisit this matter when discussing the coor-
dinating power of the contract. Each price in the menu is the going price for all
the excess capacity required by the shipper. This menu is a list of options that theInﬂuence of information on transport cost 9
Figure 1: Chain of events: decisions by players in grey
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carrier presents on a “take it or leave it” basis to the shipper for the length of the
contract and which the shipper can exercise at each period. The shipper will ask
for more capacity if the demand addressed to him exceeds the committed capacity
q, thus giving him added leeway to meet unforeseen demands that could not be
predicted when drawing up contract speciﬁcations. This is not an option in the
true sense since there is no premium to be paid but rather an option on a forward
contract as the shipper is committed to taking the available capacity offered under
the terms of the menu (quantity and price); even if the spot price is less than the
price in the menu for that given additional capacity. To compensate the shipper,
the carrier suffers a penalty θc if he cannot (or chooses no to) carry cargo above
the contracted capacity q but within q + qa.
State of nature is represented using three variables: P is the market price
for immediate transport, Q the demand addressed to S and xs the demand that
the carrier can ﬁnd on the spot market. The demand that the shipper observes
is an exogenous, stochastic variable ζQ, the demand that the carrier can garner
from the spot market is also an exogenous, stochastic variable ζS. We restrain
our view of nature to Ω(P,Q) which is the probability space containing the pos-
sible realizations of the duples of transport spot price and of demand addressed
to shipper S. FQ(.), (respectively FS(.)) are the continuously differentiable, in-
vertible and monotonous cumulative distribution functions of demand addressed
to the shipper (received by the carrier from the spot market). Fp(.) is the contin-
uously differentiable, invertible and monotonous cumulative distribution function
of the spot market price P and fp(.) its density function (mean µp and standard
deviation σp). fp has a cut-off at VC (see infra for explanation). Let f(.) be the
density function of the joint continuously differentiable, invertible and monoto-
nous cumulative distribution function F(.) of both Q and P. Let ρ ∈ [−1,1]
be the correlation factor between FQ(.) and Fp(.). Often, ρ ≥ 0 reﬂects the fact
that the carriers have specialized transport capacity and serve one single industrial
sector, leading to spot market prices rising in accordance with realized demands
addressed to the shippers because of tightening capacity all around. This causes
stronger constraints on the capacity of the carrier as well as higher variance of
transport costs to the shipper.
The total capacity of C is W. C and the other carriers offering their capacity
in the spot market have a common variable cost per unit transported VC and a ﬁxed
cost FC which is a function of the total capacity W.
In ﬁgure 1, u is the demand that S chooses to allocate to C, xL is the capacity
that C chooses to allocate to S, Min(W − xL,xs) is the capacity allocated to the
spot market by C. Satisfying the spot market does not represent an independentInﬂuence of information on transport cost 11
decision by the carrier and will not be contemplated as such in the remainder of
this paper. It is apparent that the allocation of capacity of C to S is dependant
upon the demand that S allocates to C in the ﬁrst place.
3.3 Objective functions
3.3.1 Regionalizing the probability space
We divide the probability space Ω into two-dimensioned regions according to the
decisions by both S and C (ﬁgure 3):
Ω1(Q,P) = {Q : 0 ≤ Q ≤ q;VC ≤ P}
Ω2(Q,P) = {Q : q < Q;P : VC ≤ P ≤ pa − θs}
Ω3(Q,P) = {Q : q < Q ≤ q + qa;P : pa − θs < P ≤ pa + θc}
Ω4(Q,P) = {Q : q < Q ≤ q + qa;P : pa + θc < P}
Ω5(Q,P) = {Q : q + qa < Q ≤ W;VC ≤ P ≤ pa − θs}
Ω6(Q,P) = {Q : q + qa < Q ≤ W;pa − θs < P ≤ pa + θc}
Ω7(Q,P) = {Q : q + qa < Q ≤ W;pa + θc < P}
Ω8(Q,P) = {Q : W < Q;VC ≤ P}
Ω9(Q,P) = {Q : W < Q;pa − θs < P ≤ pa + θc}
Ω10(Q,P) = {Q : W < Q;pa + θc < P}
(1)
3.3.2 Carrier objective function
In our setting, carrier C has just two customers: S and the spot market (ﬁgure
1). The spot market receives attention insofar as P > VC, in the other case, as it
would uneconomical for any carrier to derive any capacity to it, the demand from
the spot would go unfulﬁlled and hence is considered as non existent. We could
have included in our model the possibility by the carrier to sell all his excess ca-
pacity on the spot market. We felt, however, that this would have been a too great
departure from real practice as the lead time to be able to sell all excess capacity
depends upon the knowledge of all market demand. This knowledge requires the
assumption that the carrier C has an extensive commercial network or that infor-
mation gathering is costless. As the experience of the freight matching exchanges
show, this is not true. So we have assumed that this knowledge is not given. If the
summed demands from these two do not reach total capacity, the excess capacity
is lost for all intents and purposes: carrier C cannot sell all his excess capacity,Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 12
Figure 3: Probability spaces for spot price and demand addressed to S
reﬂecting true market reality. This unused capacity impacts the carrier’s proﬁtabil-
ity and ability to support the long-term investments that he must incur to face the
demands at least from S. We have not included it as a separate objective to carrier
C as all components are already present in the objective function.
The carrier’s decision variable is the capacity he allots to the shipper: xL is
the allotted capacity to S and min(W −xL,xs)|P > VC to the spot market. W −
xL − xsis the wasted capacity. We consider that the ﬁxed costs of supporting the
necessary assets are speciﬁc, sunk and that the carrier does not have the choice to
withdrawfromtheallocationgamewithS. Wethereforeneglectallconsiderations
as to ﬁxed costs of C. His proﬁt function can thus be written by using the terms
of the contract.
W ≥ xL + xs
0 < q + qa ≤ W
0 ≤ θs < c, 0 ≤ θc < c
0 ≤ qa < q, c ≤ pa
0 ≤ u,0 ≤ xL, 0 ≤ xs, VC < P, xL ≤ u
(2)
The proﬁt function is conditional upon the allocation by S and the spot marketInﬂuence of information on transport cost 13
price:
π (xL|u,Ωi) = Ri (xL|Ωi) + Pxs − VC (xL + xs) (3)
Where VC is the unit variable cost and where Ri is a revenue function, condi-





xLc−(min(u,q)−xL)θc+(q−u)θs when 0 ≤ xL < q
qc + (xL − q)pa when q ≤ xL≤q + qa
qc + (xL − q)pa + (xL − q − qa)P when q + qa<xL≤W
.
(4)
q, qa, c, pa and θc, θs are the parameters deﬁned by the contract. P is the spot
market price (ﬁgure 4).
Figure 4: Behaviour of Ri(xL|u,Ωi)
3.3.3 Shipper objective function
Shipper S produces and sells a product that requires transportation. To ensure that
budget cost constraints are met and cost variance remains low, her best option is to
negotiate beforehand a contract with a duly selected carrier whereby the average
predicted level of demand that she has budgeted can be transported for a known
and deﬁned price. When that contract is in place, she must decide whether to
allocate her necessity to her chosen contractual carrier or to the spot market. She
plays the role of the Stackelberg leader in this game.
The decision variable u can take all values between 0 and total received de-
mand Q and varies according to the different probability spaces where both P and
Q can vary (ﬁgure 5). Whatever transport necessity is not being allocated to C
shall be attributed to the spot market at the going spot price P. The function isInﬂuence of information on transport cost 14
Figure 5: Behaviour of C(u)
conditional upon the response S receives from C which is represented by xL(u).
Ci (u|xL,Ωi) = (5) 
           
           
cxL(u) + [q − u]+θs + (min(q,u) − xL (u))θc + (Q − xL (u))P
when 0 ≤ xL (u) ≤ q
cq + (xL(u) − q)pa − [u − xL(u)]
+ θc + [Q − u]+θs + (Q − xL (u))P
when q < x(u) ≤ q + qa











θs + (Q − xL (u))P
when q + qa < x(u)
. (6)
3.3.4 Deﬁning optimal decisions according to demand and spot price
In each region of probability space, the optimal decisions by each player are dif-
ferent. Let us call RΩ and CΩ the revenue and cost functions over each separate
domain identiﬁed by its number. Demand coming from the spot market that the
carrier has identiﬁed is satisﬁed insofar as P > VC. After satisfying the demand
from the shipper, the carrier must still try to satisfy demand from the spot market,
whenever the spot price is higher than his variable cost.
Table 1 recapitulates the results synthetically.
3.3.5 Expected cost and variance of transport cost
Given that we now have deﬁned the costs to the shipper over all regions of the





Qc+(q − Q)θs+min(W − Q,Qs)P −
VC (Q + Qs)
Qc + (q − Q)θs
Ω2 q q
qc + (Q − q)(P + θs) +
min(W − Q,Qs)P − VC (Q + Qs)
qc + (Q − q)(P + θs)
Ω3 Q Q
qc+(Q − q)pa +min(W − Q,Qs)P −
VC (Q + Qs)
qc + (Q − q)pa
Ω4 Q q
qc + (Q − q)(P − θc) +
min(W − Q,Qs)P − VC (Q + Qs)
qc + (Q − q)(P − θc)
Ω5 q q
qc + qaθs +
(Q − q + min(W − Q,Qs))P −
VC (Q + Qs)
qc + qaθs + (Q − q)P
Ω6 Q Q
qc + qapa +
(Q − q − qa+min(W − Q,Qs))P −
VC (Q + Qs)
qc + qapa +
(Q − q − qa)P
Ω7 Q q
qc + qaθc +
(Q − q + min(W − Q,Qs))P −
VC (Q + Qs)
qc + qaθc + (Q − q)P
Ω8 q q
qc + qaθs +
(W − q − qa + min(W − Q,Qs))P −
VC (Q + Qs)
qc + qaθs + (Q − q)P
Ω9 Q Q
qc + qapa +
(W − q − qa + min(W − Q,Qs))P −
VC (Q + Qs)
qc + qapa +
(Q − q − qa)P
Ω10 Q q
qc + qaθc +
(W − q + min(W − Q,Qs))P −
VC (Q + Qs)
qc + qaθc + (Q − q)P
Table 1: Optimal decisions and proﬁt or cost functionsInﬂuence of information on transport cost 16













3.4 Information Scenario analysis
We can now start modeling how each actor behaves according to the information
he holds privately or that is common to both and see analytically the impact on
their objective functions.
We put a superscript index for each scenario on the carrier proﬁt, shipper cost
and standard deviation functions (π1
C;C1;σ1;R1 for scenario 1 for example).
3.4.1 Scenario 1: Common information
The carrier and shipper share information truthfully, as if coordinated by a sin-
gle centralized organization. This scenario generates the maximum total proﬁt.
According to the observed demands and spot price, shipper S decides to allocate
the maximum of the realized demand to C and C allocates the maximum of his
capacity to satisfy S.
u = Q,xL = min(W,Q) (8)
The optimized revenue function R for C varies according to the different val-




s ,Q,xs,P) − VC(x1∗
L ,x1∗
s )
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω1 Qc + (q − Q)θs + min(W − Q,xs)P
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω2 ∪ Ω3 ∪ Ω4 qc + (Q − q)pa + min(W − Q,xs)P
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω5 ∪ Ω6 ∪ Ω7 qc + qapa + ((Q − q − qa) + min(W − Q,xs))P
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω8 ∪ Ω9 ∪ Ω10 qc + qapa + (W − q − qa)P
Table 2: Revenue function for the carrier in terms of the regions
The optimized cost function of S becomes:
In this scenario, the Stackelberg position of S does not inﬂuence the outcome
since no deviation will occur.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 17
C1(u1∗,Ω1 =
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω1 Qc + (q − Q)θs
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω2 ∪ Ω3 ∪ Ω4 qc + (Q − q)pa
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω5 ∪ Ω6 ∪ Ω7 qc + qapa + ((Q − q − qa) + min(W − Q,xs))P
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω8 ∪ Ω9 ∪ Ω10 qc + qapa + (Q − q − qa)P
Table 3: Revenue function for the shipper in terms of the regions
The conditional expected cost as a function of the received demand Q subject






















q+qa (Qc + qapa + (Q − q − qa)P)f (Q,P)dQdP
(9)
3.4.2 Scenario 2: Asymmetric information
C has private information on W, the transport capacity. Ex ante, S has veriﬁed
that C has at his disposal sufﬁcient capacity to comply with q. She did not or
could not verify the existence or size of the additional capacity S has to invest
in to meet the commitments of the menu of prices (possible sub-contractors to C,
extension of capacity in future, changes in other client demand patterns, etc are
all possible reasons for such lack of observation).
So C has an opportunity to deviate when P is higher than pa + θc. If C
deviates, the demand in excess of q by S has to be offered to the spot market. So
the cost increases for S. C has been modeled to take that same amount from the
spot market at the spot price so as to make it easier to compare performance and
rent transfer between both players in the conclusions. The exact demand Q of S is
here assumed observable by both S and C. The cost function of S and the revenue
function of C can be summarised in table 4:
3.4.3 Scenario 3: Private information
In this scenario, C has private information on W, S has private information on the
demand Q: so both have an option to behave opportunistically according to the




Ω1 Qc + (q − Q)θs c + (q − Q)θs
Ω2 ∪ Ω3 Id.asScen1 Id.asScen1
Ω4 qc + (Q − q)(P − θc) qc + (Q − q)(P − θc)
Ω5 ∪ Ω6 qc + qapa + (min(W,Q) − q)P qc + qapa + (Q − q − qa)P
Ω7 qc + qaθc + (Q − q)P qc + qaθc + (Q − q)P
Ω8 ∪ Ω9 qc + qapa + (W − q − qa)P qc + qapa + (Q − q − qa)P
Ω10 qc + qaθc + (W − q)P qc + qaθc + (Q − q)P




Ω1 Qc + (q − Q)θs c + (q − Q)θs
Ω2 qc + (Q − q)P qc + (Q − q)P
Ω3 qc + (Q − q)pa qc + (Q − q)pa
Ω4 qc + (Q − q)P qc + (Q − q)P
Ω5 qc + (Q − q)P qc + (Q − q)P
Ω6 qc + qapa + ((Q − q − qa) + Q − W)P qc + qapa + (Q − q − qa)
Ω7 qc + (Q − q)P qc + (Q − q)P
Ω8 qc + qapa + (W − q − qa)P qc + qapa + (Q − q − qa)P
Ω9 qc + qapa + (W − q − qa)P qc + qapa + (Q − q − qa)P
Ω10 qc + (W − q)P qc + (Q − q)P
Table 5: Cost and revenue functions when information is private (Scenario 3)
the menu of prices is unenforceable. For any spot price either higher or lower
than the menu price pa according to the additional capacity necessary, either the
shipper or the carrier decides to go to the spot market. The other party, for lack
of knowledge of capacity or cargo, cannot ask for nor receive any compensation.
The results are listed in table 5.
3.5 Comparing scenarii
3.5.1 Comparison between scenario 1 and 2
The differences between scenario 1 and scenario 2 can be calculated by using the
partitions already created (see ﬁgure 3): we have a difference only when Q comes
in between q and q+qa and the spot price happens to be above pa + θc, whichInﬂuence of information on transport cost 19
belongs to partition Ω4 ∪ Ω7 ∪ Ω10.






























= (Q − q)(P − θc − pa) (11)
By deﬁnition of the contract parameters, we can write:
∀(Q,P) ∈ Ω4 ∪ Ω7 ∪ Ω10
π2 (x2∗
L ,u2∗,Q,P) − π1 (x1∗
L ,u1∗,Q,P) ≥ 0
C2 (u2∗,x2∗
L ,Q,P) − C1 (u1∗,x1∗
L ,Q,P) ≥ 0
Both results are positive if there is but one instance of both the spot price
higher than the menu of prices ﬁxed in the contract plus the carrier penalty and
existence of cargo to be taken in excess of base commitment q.
There is a transfer of resources from S to C when C can deviates from truthful
behaviour by hiding the exact capacity he has at his disposal and withhold extra
capacity from S to sell it to the spot market at a higher price.
The conditional expected cost of the difference in information is written:
E (C2 (u2∗,x2∗






= E (π2 (x2∗
L ,u2∗,Q,P) − π1 (x1∗
L ,u1∗,Q,P))
(12)
The variance of the transport cost to S increases with the variances of the com-
ponent laws: ζL and P affected by the values given to the contractual parameters.
3.5.2 Comparison between scenario 1 and 3
The differences occur in regions Ω2,Ω4,Ω5, Ω7, Ω8 and Ω10 when either the































= (Q − q)(pa − P) (14)
























= (Q − q)(P − pa) (16)









∗,Q,P) = qa (P − pa) (17)









∗,Q,P) = qa (P − pa) (18)


















∗,Q,P) = 0 (20)
The conditional expectation of this difference subject to P and Q can be written
as:
E (C3 (x3∗





















(qa (P − pa))f (Q,P)dQdP
(21)
Following the same reasoning, we can write the conditional expectation of the
difference, subject to P and Q, of the proﬁt to the carrier as:
E (π3 (x3∗





















(qa (pa − P))f (Q,P)dQdP+
(22)
These indications give guidance to the way the contractual parameters have to
be negotiated by the shipper and the carrier so that if the information conditions
are not given, at least the differences between both scenarios can be minimized.
Such uncertainties and optimization of the contractual parameters will be the sub-
ject of another paper. For now, we have found that applying the preceding reason-
ing through a numerical study would give some indications as to the importance
of the different parameters on behaviour by S and C.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 21
4 Numerical study
4.1 Elaboration of the sample
In this section, we perform a numerical study to gain further insight into how the
3 scenarios affect the overall efﬁciency of the supply chain, revealing the impact
thatbothcontractcharacteristicsandinformationsharinghaveontheoverallproﬁt
and EFR of the supply chain.
We have taken the most general case for the demands addressed to the ship-
pers and the price for spot transportation: exogenous stochastic variables with
possibilities that they can be correlated. This study has been based upon a sample
generated through the normal distribution random number generator of Microsoft
Excel XP. The demand coming from the spot market is derived from the generated
numbers for shipper S through the formula for bivariate normal distribution:
X = µ1 + σ1U
Y = µ2 + σ2
p
1 − ρ2V
Where X ∼ N(µ1, σ1), Y ∼ N(µ2, σ2), U and V are independent random variables,
eachwithnormaldistributions, andρD =0.60thecorrelationfactorbetweenXand
Y.
The spot price distribution is also normal and correlated with the demand Q




We have generated 1000 occurrences of triples (Q,Qs,P) (see 7). When fur-
ther analysis into a particular result which has an important bearing on the ﬁnal
conclusion of the reasoning, we have ﬁxed the corresponding parameters for the
contract and repeated the sample 250 times. We then compare the 250 averages
and calculate their conﬁdence intervals and corresponding p-values.
We ﬁrst evaluate the base scenario given the costs and other parameters de-
tailed in Table 1 for the shippers and the carrier. Later, we study the impact pro-
duced by the variation of different parameters and conclude as to the resulting
supply chain efﬁciency.
4.2 Setting of other variables of the model







Mean 98.3 98.6 5
Standard deviation 24.7 25.9 1.03
Correlation factor 0.6 0.2
Table 6: Base demand distribution parameters for numerical study












120 4 1 1 25
Table 7: Base parameters for numerical study
The menu of prices offered by the carrier C to the shipper S for demands
exceeding contracted capacity are given in table 8.
For qa in range < 5 6 to 10 11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 25
The price is pa 4.25 4.50 4.75 5 5.25
Table 8: Base parameters for numerical study
THE CARRIER INTERNAL COST AND CAPACITY:
The total cost for the carrier if the total capacity is used is 400+2∗200 = 800.
We consider that one unit of demand is carried at the transport price.
5 Impact of contract characteristics as coordination
factors of the supply chain
In this section, we study the impact of the different contract characteristics on
the principal elements of the objective functions of the carrier and shipper. WeInﬂuence of information on transport cost 23
Capacity W Variable cost per unit V c Fixed cost Fc(W)
200 2 400
Table 9: Base parameters for numerical study
approach the inﬂuence of the same contract characteristics on the information
scenarios only in the next section.
Three stages of coordination can be deﬁned (table 10): the ﬁrst is the case of
the market: no contract, total dependence on the spot price. The second is the
case of the shipper S in scenario 3: he can’t have the penalties limiting deviation
on both sides enforced, so only the basic commitment on capacity and price exist.
The third is the case of S in scenario 1, when all necessary information is common
knowledge. Using 250 samples of 1000 triplets to calculate the following results,
we can show the following results:
p-value < 0.01 Average Transport Cost Std Deviation
No contract 485.9 (±0.9) 181.1 (±0.7)
Contract no penalties 402.6 (±0.54) 106.0 (±0.4)
Contract & penalties 425.6 (±0.44) 87.1 (±0.4)
Table 10: Impact of coordination on two criteria with c=4, q=120, qa=25
5.1 Penalties
In the present case, incentive compatibility given by the contract is through the
penalties that either the shipper or the carrier can suffer. We have quantiﬁed this
impact by varying the size of both penalties at the same time.
In the scenario of complete information, as both the contract capacity price c
and penalties θs and θc go down, the standard deviation of the cost to shipper S
goes up which is intuitive. At a given contract price c, standard deviation of cost
increases inversely to the penalties (ﬁgure 6 has p-values of 0.01, no thicker than
the width of the lines). As can be expected, the average cost of transport follows
the evolution of penalties.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 24
Figure 6: Impact of penalties on the standard deviation of transport cost for S at
given cInﬂuence of information on transport cost 25
5.2 Contract price
As another coordinating lever, what inﬂuence does the contract price have on the
average cost and the variance of the transport cost to the shipper? Would a higher
price offered to the carrier sufﬁce to induce better incentive compatibility?
Let us consider ﬁrst the variance of transport costs (table 10). Thanks to the
contract in place, S has a transport cost variance of 87.1 vs 181.1 for the spot
market, about half. She also enjoys lower overall average cost for her transport.
p-value<0.01 Contract price
3.5 4 4.5 5
Average cost 375.8 425.6 475.4 525.2
Std Deviation 74.4 87.05 98.8 110.7
kurtosis 19.8% 20.4% 20.8% 21.1%
Table 11: Shipper S statistics with long-term contract in place scenario 1
In table 11 we see that ceteris paribus a higher contract price does not warrant
lower relative cost variance.
5.3 Contract capacity and additional capacity
The average transport cost (which reﬂects the added penalty cost to the shipper)
grows both when capacity and additional capacity contracted grow, which is intu-
itive since this reﬂects the latitude that the shipper has in asking for more capacity
and lessening the impact of the penalty. Almost as intuitive is the result that
the variance of the cost diminishes as capacity and additional capacity increase.
All these parameters should lead the shipper to try to negotiate a “sweet spot” of
compromise between cost and variance. In our numerical example, this sweet spot
would be in the region of a contract capacity of 120 with an additional capacity of
10 (Figure 7) where the average cost plus one standard deviation is at its lowest:
But this result does not take into account the cost of this capacity. To include




Where µcost is the average cost of transport for each duple (capacity, addi-
tional capacity) and σcost is the standard deviation of the average cost of transportInﬂuence of information on transport cost 26
Figure 7: Average cost + 1 standard deviation according to capacity and additional
capacity
for each duple (capacity, additional capacity); Min(µcost + σcost) is the minimum
observed of the average costs for all combinations of capacity and additional ca-
pacity.
According to the graph of these efﬁciency ratios (ﬁgure 8), the optimum con-




penalty θc = 1
contract price c = 4
menu of prices pa: from 4 to 5 in steps of 0.25
5.4 Menu of prices hierarchy
The menu offered to the shipper in our central numerical example is the following
(table 12):
The prices increase with the demand from the shipper: if the shipper observes
a demand Q of 144, he can get from shipper S a contract capacity of:Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 27
Figure 8: Graph of efﬁciency ratio for 3 capacities and all additional capacities,
p-values <0.01
qa pa
0 - 4 4
5 - 9 4.25
10 - 14 4.50
15 - 19 4.75
20 - 24 5.00
25 5.25
Table 12: Menu of prices in contractInﬂuence of information on transport cost 28
q = 120
and additional capacity:
Q – qa = 24
For that capacity, the menu price is:
pa = 5.00.
Why doesn’t the carrier offer some kind of volume rebate as an inducement?
One must remember that transport is a non-scalable capital-intensive production
facility. If one admits that the available capacity is divided into discrete facilities
(whether trucks, vessels, conveyor belts, rail carriages, pipelines) with different
cost structures and usable lives, then of course the lowest cost facilities are used
ﬁrst and progressively higher cost facilities are brought into use as demand in-
creases. Hence, marginal costs increase with demand. On the other side of the
equation, giving additional ﬂexibility to the client has been established to increase
his “willingness-to-pay” by Tsay (1999). On average, the shipper is marginally
better off accepting the offered menu price rather than buying the needed capac-
ity from the spot market (not so much because he thus lowers his average cost
as because he reduces the standard deviation of such cost from 87.86 (scenario
3) to 86.56 (see table 6) and reduces the transaction involved in buying from the
spot market instead of from the contracted carrier. So he will accept ex ante the
menu in the contract. Of course, the carrier is also worse off offering the menu,
but less than if he were to offer volume discounts! In effect, the carrier might not
offer any menu at all (his revenues would increase slightly). The menu is in fact
another way to coax the shipper S into allocating him extra work, enabling him
to increase his capacity utilisation over the whole life of the contract. A situation
which is always better than having to look for cargo in the spot market. The for-
feited revenue can be more than compensated by added transaction costs and lack
of transparency in the spot market.
5.4.1 Carrier’s point of view
The interest of a contract to the carrier is clear as he has to commit capital over the
long term in new capacity to satisfy the shipper’s demand. The transport market
being illiquid and commercial relationships being very tradition-bound, the carrierInﬂuence of information on transport cost 29
probably would not have invested in additional capacity just to satisfy the spot
market.
He turns a proﬁt because he can further leverage the available capacity to win
more business from the spot market in the cases when S does not receive enough
demand. Considering that his total assets have a capacity of 200, that he has a
ﬁxed cost of 400, it can be said that the total cost “allocated” to the contract is:
Fixed cost in contract = 400
200.125 = 250
Variable cost in contract = 125.2 = 250
Total cost per unit = 250+250
125 = 4
When c = 4, the carrier makes a tidy proﬁt of 135.71. He even makes a
proﬁt when c = 3.75 ceteris paribus, as shown below (table 14), because he can
“subsidize” the contract by selling excess capacity onto the spot market at a much
higher mean price. So his real proﬁt lies in his ability to build upon the sunk
capacity to look for other commercial opportunities outside the relationship to
shipper S. He can allow the contract price to be less than the “allocated” total
cost because of the reduced variance of his revenues as can be concluded by the
following table where we have calculated the variance of the carrier’s revenues in
the case he works with a contract with S and in the case where he sells his total
capacity on the spot market (no contract) (table 13). His revenues are lower but
he has the security of a substantially longer term view over a period designed to
last the life of the speciﬁc assets acquired.






Average revenue 812.4 0.7 918.4 1.2
Standard Deviation 132.5 0.5 241.6 0.8
Proﬁt 47.6 0.5 49.7 0.5
Table 13: Impact of contract on carrier performance under full information c =
3.75,θs = θc = 1,qL = 120
Overall, he is much better off ensuring a stable and reliable stream of revenues
by linking the investment to the contract with the shipper.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 30
5.5 Conclusion on contractual coordination
We observe that to the shipper, average transport cost, variance of transport cost
can be noticeably improved by replacing a pure spot buying of transport capacity
by a suitable mix of two procurement strategies: one taking a long-term approach
by a designed contract between the carrier and the shipper, another by comple-
menting this long-term approach by a short-term one that consists of spot-market
buying for a fraction of every period’s transportation needs (table 14). A similar
conclusion has been reported in Seifert et al. (2004).
Another aspect we haven’t touched on heretofore is the fact that a shipper will
not even evaluate carriers who do not meet order-qualifying minimum acceptable
levels in four performance dimensions: logistical cost, logistical productivity, cus-
tomer service and quality. Morash (2001) in his ﬁeld study of north American
and Canadian Council of Logistics Management Association (CLM in the US
and CALM in Canada) has ranked seven major types of supply chain capabilities
according to their importance, once minimum levels have been met. Customer
service, quality and information systems support came top, ahead of logistics cost
and productivity. These quality or reliability of service clauses are of paramount
importance to the shipper and override cost considerations.
No attempt has been made to quantify the impact of variations of the spot mar-
ket price volatility here. Further study should be put in measuring the difference
in efﬁciency between the pure spot strategy and the contract/spot one by changing
transport price volatility.
p-value Pure spot buying Mix contract + spot









Shipper 181.1 (±0.7) 485.9(±0.9) 86.6 (±0.4) 425.1(±0.4)
Carrier 241.3 (±0.8) 918.4(±1.2) 135.7(±0.5) 837.4(±0.7)
Table 14: Comparative of contractual coordination vs no coordination
We now have established how a carefully crafted contract and appropriate
spot buying can enhance the overall efﬁciency of the supply chain, we proceed
to demonstrate how sharing information between carrier and shipper S impacts
their proﬁtability and variance of results or costs.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 31
5.6 Impact of information sharing on shipper and carrier
Wecomearoundtothestudyofthecombinedinﬂuenceofthecoordinationfactors
across the information scenarios deﬁned earlier.
Our model has been limited to studying the impact of only three parameters of
information on the performance and efﬁciency of the supply chain:
• W : total transport capacity of C
• Q: realized demand of S
• P: spot price.
The study concentrates on the interactions between S and C and on the in-
ﬂuence of sharing the above three types of information. To give an idea of the
order of the differences involved, we ﬁrst begin with the central numbers in all
three scenarios (table 15). The σ/µ ratio is a measure of the kurtosis of the dis-
tribution: we have divided the transport cost standard deviation by the average
transport cost. The higher the ratio, the ﬂatter the distribution curve of the means
and thus the thicker the tails of the distribution. Throughout the three scenarios,
the carrier’s average revenue and standard deviation of revenues remain relatively
constant with a correspondingly constant kurtosis.
p-
value<0.01
Shipper S Carrier C
Mean
cost






























Table 15: Results of 3 scenarios with parameters ﬁxed in central case C = 4,q =
100,qa = 20,θc = θs = 1
It is immediate with contractual parameters having been ﬁxed as they are that
the inﬂuence of information overall is much less than the coordination induced byInﬂuence of information on transport cost 32
the carefully crafted contract mentioned earlier. However, these ex-ante adjust-
ments may not be standard practice in industry. To get a better appreciation of the
inﬂuence of these contracting parameters on the overall efﬁciency of the supply
chain and the interactions with information, we will now proceed to twiddle the
parameters two by two and see their effect across the information scenarios.
We hope that the results should help practitioners in assessing how a given
contract will inﬂuence their overall transport cost (or revenue) and what results
they should look for during initial bargaining given the known information sce-
nario they might encounter during the contract’s life.
This section is divided into three subsections. In the ﬁrst one, we vary capacity
and additional capacity and ﬁx all other contract parameters and study standard
deviation of transport cost among the three scenarios. In the second subsection,
we vary the contract price and penalties to see how their combined effects change
with access to information. In the third, we vary the contract price and capacities
and see the effects across the scenarios.
5.6.1 Inﬂuence of capacity and additional capacity
Figure 9: Transport cost standard deviation as a function of capacity and addi-
tional capacity, comparison scenario 3 – scenario 2
We see in one sample of 1000 triplets (ﬁgure 9) that under tight capacity, the
second scenario increases transport cost variance to shipper S. On the contrary,Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 33
we observe that the higher the contracted capacity q, standard deviation of trans-
port cost is indifferent to whether or not the carrier deviates from coordinated
behaviour. There is a maximum difference at a contract capacity of 90 and addi-
tional capacity of 75: scenario 2 generates high variance relative to the common
knowledge scenario. This gives an incentive to S to correctly assess initial fore-
cast average demand that she will face because the additional capacity that she
might think would bring constancy in cost is undermined if the carrier withholds
capacity from her.
Figure 10: Transport cost standard deviation as a function of capacity and addi-
tional capacity, comparison scenario 3 – scenario 2
Thethirdscenarioshowsthesamepatternofdegradationoftransportcostvari-
ance at all levels against scenario 2, and consequently against scenario 1 (ﬁgure
10).
In effect, this means that S must counterbalance the negative effects of lack of
common knowledge by carefully tuning the capacity she contracts and the addi-
tional capacity she includes in the ex-ante contract.
5.6.2 Inﬂuence of contract price and penalties
We now give the results of the standard deviation of transport cost in function of
the contract price c and the penalties θs and θc.
5.6.3 Average transport cost and standard deviation of cost
The transport cost is higher in the second scenario versus the ﬁrst when the penal-
ties and contract price are too low to induce coordination. Past a certain level,Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 34
higher contract price or penalties cannot beat common knowledge in average cost.
Figure 11: Inﬂuence of contract price and penalties on average transport cost:
scenario 2- scenario 1
The same result applies to the standard deviation of the transport cost. Basi-
cally, at a penalty of 1 and contract price of 4 differences are ironed out whether
or not the carrier deviates. (ﬁgures 11 and 12).
As for the third scenario against the ﬁrst, the results are also very similar and
warrant the same conclusion.
There is therefore no need to set up high penalties or high contract prices to
ensure coordination or compensate for lack of information.
The standard deviation of the transport cost reacts much sooner to increases
in contract price. To enhance the readability of the results, we have divided the
standard deviation thus obtained by the average transport price. We have a better
notion of the kurtosis of the distribution of the transport costs (ﬁgure 13).
The ﬁrst important comment is that the ratios all come in a very small range:
the kurtosis of distribution does not change a lot whether information is being
shared or not. Even when the contract price is higher, the standard deviation of
the transport cost increases even more, lifting the overall ratio in both the ﬁrstInﬂuence of information on transport cost 35
Figure 12: Inﬂuence of contract price and penalties on the standard deviation of
transport cost: difference between scenario 2 and 1 (p-value<0.01)
Figure 13: Kurtosis of transport cost distribution: three scenarios ( θs=θc=1, p-
value < 0.01)Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 36
and second scenarios. Only in the third case does the increased price bring higher
coordination and lower variance of cost to S.
5.6.4 Inﬂuence of contract price and capacity
Moving on to inﬂuence of contract price and capacity with information scenarios,
we start by showing the difference between scenario 2 and 1 of the average cost
of transport. Common information brings singularly high advantages when a con-
tract price is low and coupled with a low contracted capacity (ﬁgure 14). On the
contrary, when S has underestimated her needs when negotiating capacity levels
in the contract, but negotiated a c nearer to the average spot price, her average
transport cost is much nearer the cost supported in a scenario where C hides his
exact capacity from S and sells in the spot market.
Figure 14: Average cost of transport to Sas a function of capacity and contract
price, difference between scenario 2 and 1
When both carrier and shipper can deviate, the price speciﬁed in the contractInﬂuence of information on transport cost 37
for the base capacity becomes important in the overall cost if this capacity has
been underestimated. If the shipper and carrier intend to deviate, average cost will
change signiﬁcantly according to the contract price (ﬁgure 15).
Figure 15: Average cost of transport to S as a function of capacity and contract
price, difference between scenario 3 and 1
The ﬁrst scenario (ﬁgure 16) dominates the second scenario at all points and
especially when both capacity is tight and contract price is low.
Inthecomparisonbetweenthethirdandﬁrstscenarioofthestandarddeviation
of transport cost, much the same observations can be made as when looking at
average cost (ﬁgure 17). Once again, we conclude that the information asymmetry
can almost be bridged by coherent contractual ex ante arrangements.
5.7 Conclusion to numerical study
This study has been done with particular hypotheses that must be put into per-
spective. For example, we have taken normal distribution for both the demands
received and the spot price of transport. Even if this choice may be considered asInﬂuence of information on transport cost 38
Figure 16: Difference between scenario 2 and 1 of Standard Deviation of transport
cost for S
Figure 17: Difference between scenario 3 and 1 of Standard Deviation of transport
cost for SInﬂuence of information on transport cost 39
restrictive, results from the interaction with contractual parameters and informa-
tion scenarios would be similar in other symmetric distribution laws.
The choice of the parameters to be studied has much stronger inﬂuence on
the overall results than whichever choice of distribution laws, price and demand
volatilities are chosen.
The scenario of full information or common knowledge is always superior
even if in a minor way. However, as common knowledge may not be given be-
tween a carrier and a shipper when negotiating their ﬁrst contract, each must then
recur to ﬁne tuning the contract parameters to regain most of the advantages to be
had as result of a trust or central coordination scenario.
In table 16 are recorded the ideal contract that both the carrier and the shipper
should strive to sign when common knowledge or observability are not given.




θc = θs 1
Average cost 425.5(±0.4) 426.0(±0.4) 427.0(±0.5)
Stand Deviation 86.90(±0.4) 88.07(±0.4) 89.6(±0.4)
Market characteristics
Q Qs P
Average 98.4 98.6 4.98
Standard Deviation 24.8 25.0 1.03
Table 16: Contract parameters that optimize costs for the shipper among diverse
information scenarios
These results must be related to the environment in which both carrier and
shipper negotiate. The best way is to relate the contract characteristics to the spot
price and to the demand addressed to the shipper. The shipper must settle for a
contract price c that is one standard deviation less than the average price of spot
capacity observed in the market. He must also contract approximately his forecast
average necessity plus one standard deviation and an additional capacity equal to
around half a standard deviation of the forecast demand he will receive. Penalties
should represent 25% of the contract price for the base capacity commitment. All
those objectives should be achieved together in the contract for best results.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 40
6 Conclusion and possible evolution
In this paper, we show the importance and effects that information sharing can
have on the proﬁtability of carriers and shippers. This example sticks to actual in-
dustrial conditions so as to enable readers in transport procurement to easily apply
the conclusions to their own situations. The relative importance of information is
clearly marked out so as to give information sharing and trust building the share
they should have in a well thought out strategy. Given the variety of information
which must be shared in a normal shipper-carrier relationship, the opportunities
to enhance efﬁciency in the supply chain abound. This area is probably the one
where the most progress will be made in the years to come bringing to the ﬁrms
who will master it valuable nuggets of efﬁciency as well as increased responsive-
ness.
In this paper, we present transport as an individualized supply chain member
and supplier to the chain. We have modelled the impact and inﬂuence that in-
formation sharing and coordination with transport suppliers has on the efﬁciency
of the supply chain. The present model only studies the inﬂuence of three in-
formation factors and six coordination factors on the cost, standard deviation of
such cost of the transport supplier to the supply chain. We have not considered
agglomerating these three gauges into one sole efﬁciency index as we believe that
this would entail a loss of information from the point of view of application to
practice.
Given limitations due to a special case of binormal distribution, however, the
conclusionswearriveatareinterestinginadvancingthedebateabouttheinﬂuence
of information asymmetry and contractual coordination in the supply chain for
transport.
1. First, as in Seifert et al. (2004), we conﬁrm that adopting a procurement
policy where spot buying complements contract buying is a superior policy
to the one consisting of pure spot buying. In particular, standard deviation
of the transport cost in a mixed contract and spot buying strategy is half the
one in pure spot buying.
2. The contract in the mixed strategy must include a ﬁxed capacity commit-
ment and some additional ﬂexibility in capacity (QF clause).
3. Penalties should be included: the carrier is penalised when he cannot com-
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when he cannot fulﬁl his buying engagements. We have shown that this
ensures coordination.
4. We show that the carrier, even if his revenues are not as high when linked to
a shipper by a contract, still has ample motivation to elect such a choice as
opposed to selling his capacity in the spot market.
5. The numerical study clearly shows that some contractual arrangements ex-
isting ex-ante have singular power to iron out information asymmetry be-
tween carrier and shipper. Overall, contractual arrangements do not dom-
inate the results of central coordination or costless information. To reach
this level of central coordination, we argue that the best way is for both
shipper and carrier to trust each other. This truthfulness should enable each
party to build a trust relationship and his or her reputation in the sense of
Williamson (1996) (“a farsighted approach to contracting (in which credible
commitments, or lack thereof, play a key role)”).
6. We have proved that if the committed contract capacity ﬁxed in the contract
is too low (less than the estimated average of demand plus one standard de-
viation) and when the contract price is set too low compared to the current
average spot price observed, the carrier has a strong incentive to behave
opportunistically and fail the shipper, causing increase in average transport
cost and standard deviation of cost. In this case, whatever their level, penal-
ties bear only incidental inﬂuence.
7. The information imbalances induced by keeping private information as to
the real transport capacity by the carrier, the real demand received by the
shipper is detrimental to the overall efﬁciency of the supply chain, when
the ex-ante contractual coordination mechanism has been poorly designed,
becauseitencouragesdeviantattitudesbothfromthecarrierandtheshipper.
We have proved that these imbalances are a direct function of the contract
parameters negotiated.
8. Carefully crafted ex-ante contractual arrangements can substantially cor-
rect this information asymmetry but increases the overall transport cost to
the shipper. The most inﬂuential factors in the contract are the committed
capacity, the contract price for this committed capacity and, to a lesser de-
gree, the additional capacity with an increasing menu of prices offered by
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One prolongation of the present paper will deal with solving the mathematical
model for the optimal contract parameters both in terms of information as well as
coordination as expressed in terms of cost and standard deviation.
The aim of the supply chain manager should be to reduce variance in costs
because, in a multi-period game, it increases the notorious double margining phe-
nomenon. The shipper increases his budgeted costs because he cannot ensure reg-
ularity of his cost and hence must protect himself by padding his transport budget;
the carrier because he has to contend with ﬁxed cost non-scalable capacity and so
must also preserve his ﬁnancial health by higher than warranted proﬁt margins.
Another avenue to be explored is the study of how standard deviation of trans-
port cost is affected by different levels of the variance of both the spot price P and
the demand Q (along the lines of Seifert et al. , 2004, Gavirneni et al. , 1999).
In all cases, the most interesting point to study is to allow the carrier to in-
crease capacity utilization and reduce revenue volatility and thus share with the
supply chain the economies. The net effect to the supply chain would be to reduce
the total investment cost of the transport capacity contracted and hence the total
transport cost component. In fact, the logistics industry as a whole is investing and
developing tools to enhance the circulation of information among the interested
parties as has been shown in the survey in Peters (2002).
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7 Appendix A – Characteristics of the numerical ex-
ample of the study
For most of the graphs in the paper, we have generated a sample of 1000 triplets
(Q, Qs, P).
This sample is generated through the Microsoft Excel worksheet function ran-
dom number generator for normal distribution. Q has an average of 100 and a
standard deviation of 25. Qs is built according to the bivariate normal distribu-
tion with a correlation factor to Q of ρ = 0.6. Ps is also generated along a same
bivariate normal distribution with a correlation factor to Q of ρ = 0.20.
When more robust results were called for, we have generated 250 samples of
1000 triplets and averaged them using the Central Limit Theorem. Wherever that
has been the case, we give the conﬁdence interval with a p-value <0.01.
This is one graph of the distribution of Qs vs Qfor one sample of 1000 triplets
(18):
We have grouped the demands in categories of 6 from less than 22 to more
than 172 20:
These samples have the following statistics:
Q : µL = 98.4, σL = 24.75
Qs : µS = 98.6 σS = 25.96
P : µp = 4.98 σp = 1.03
Due to an identiﬁed and documented bias in the Microsoft Excel worksheet
number generator, the left hand side distribution tail is slightly too thick compared
to the normal one, but the result is not affected and we could even argue that this
skewness is more life-like 21.Inﬂuence of information on transport cost 46
Figure 18: QQ plot of Qs over QInﬂuence of information on transport cost 47
Figure 19: QQ plot of P over QInﬂuence of information on transport cost 48
Figure 20: Graph of the distribution of the 1000 occurrences of Q and Qs
Figure 21: Graph of the spot transport price distributionInﬂuence of information on transport cost 49
The volatility level that has been chosen for this numerical study has entailed
a range of prices from a low of 1.43 and a maximum of 8.41. We have been
exposed through industrial practice to other examples of spot market volatility in
the transport industry. Though our choice is not borne out by statistical evidence,
the one we have simulated seems to have only slightly exaggerated tails and is
probablytoo“ﬂat”comparedtoreality. Thisisbothaproductofdesigntoenhance
visibility of results. We hope that the reader will agree with us that this choice but
does not impair the validity neither of the reasoning nor of the conclusions.